The issue I brought up is nothing about it is high-assurance except maybe tamper-resistance on a HSM involved. It's a term abused in the certificate market a lot. An easy hint to tell is if it's a product developed slowly in a safe subset of C, Java, or Ada. Those have the tooling needed for highly-robust implementations. Then look at the OS to see if it's something extremely hardened or unusual (eg separation kernel RTOS). The protocols will be ultra-simple with a lot of high-availability and easy recovery. Almost no modern tooling will be in the TCB for configuration or deployment unless it's simple. Most of it isn't.

I'm not seeing any of this in the reporting that made it here. Definitely not high-assurance. Likely compromised by high-end attackers either for specific targets or in some general way. It will help protect in its intended way against the rest, though. Enormously positive development. Just not high-assurance security at any level.